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“In my view, the Court’s majority messed up the Federal Rules.”
–Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg1
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INTRODUCTION
The past decade has not been kind to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure (the Rules). From the growth of summary judgment as a
*

J.D., Seattle University School of Law, 2016; B.A., Central Washington University, 2001. I would
like to thank Professor Brooke Coleman, whose expertise and passion for civil procedure is positively infectious, as well as Professor Sara Rankin, without whom this author’s writing would be a hazy
shadow of what it is and might still yet become. Finally, but most emphatically, I thank my mother,
Dr. Debbie Olson, Ph.D. She would insist that my accomplishments are the result of splendid parenting, and I would be hard-pressed to disagree.
1. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Assoc. Justice, Supreme Court of the United States, Remarks for
Second Circuit Judicial Conference (June 12, 2009), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/
publicinfo/speeches/viewspeech/sp_06-12-09.
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mechanism to let judges instead of juries determine facts,2 to the
love–hate relationship with class actions,3 judicial interpretations of the
Rules have revealed a trend toward complicating the ability of plaintiffs
to find redress for their claims.4 Nowhere is this more apparent than in
the shifting standards of pleading requirements under Rule 8. Much has
been written by academics and practitioners alike regarding the ripples
caused by Twombly and Iqbal.5 Although the Court would like to believe
otherwise, would-be plaintiffs are faced with a greater pleading standard
than the plain language of Rule 8 suggests. Now, a new victim of judicial
misinterpretation has emerged: the Appendix of Forms under Rule 84.
In its entirety, the Rules are designed with the overarching purpose
of securing the “just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every
action and proceeding.”6 Rule 84 and the accompanying Appendix of
Forms were initially adopted in 1938 to illustrate the “simplicity and
brevity . . . which the [R]ules contemplate.”7 In fact, the practice of
providing sample forms can be traced back to the twelfth century English
legal system wherein an aggrieved party petitioned for a writ from the
Crown carefully tailored to the specific legal claim involved.8 Using the
wrong writ led to a failure of the claim; thus, sample writs were compiled
and provided for lawyers to use.9
Although critics often debate whether the present-day forms were
in fact relied upon by practitioners, their adoption served as a reflection
of what the Rules are meant to be—a type of check and balance against
2. See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 395 (2007) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Whether a person’s
actions have risen to a level warranting deadly force is a question of fact best reserved for a jury.
Here, the Court has usurped the jury’s factfinding function and, in doing so, implicitly labeled the
four other judges to review the case unreasonable.”).
3. See, e.g., Comcast Corp. v. Behrend, 133 S. Ct. 1426, 1432 (2013) (quoting prior case law
referring to one component of class action suits as an “adventuresome innovation”); Eisen v. Carlisle
& Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 169 (1974) (quoting one case describing the litigation as a “Frankenstein
monster posing as a class action”).
4. See, e.g., Wal-Mart Stores v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2562 (2011) (Ginsburg, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (finding fault with the majority’s use of what appears to be a Rule
23(b)(3) test in a Rule 23(a) analysis); Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (noting that conclusory allegations unsupported by well-pleaded facts are disregarded under Rule 8); Harris, 550
U.S. at 380–81 (holding that the court’s interpretation of the video tape was the only reasonable
interpretation sufficient for summary judgment under Rule 56); Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550
U.S. 544, 556 (2007) (finding a requirement of plausibility in Rule 8).
5. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662; Twombly, 550 U.S. 544. These cases are discussed in greater detail later
in this Note.
6. FED. R. CIV. P. 1.
7. FED. R. CIV. P. 84 advisory committee’s note (2015) (internal quotations omitted).
8. A. Benjamin Spencer, The Forms Had a Function 3–4 (Va. Pub. Law & Legal Theory Research, Working Paper No. 2014-44, 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=2472083.
9. Id. at 4.

2016]

If It (Ain’t) Broke, Don’t Fix It

1377

expansive judicial interpretation contrary to the liberal vision of the
Rules.10 As an example of this, Rule 8 requires that a complaint need
only a “short and plain statement” of jurisdiction, the claim entitling the
pleader to relief, and a demand for the relief sought.11 Accompanying
this rule, Form 11 illustrates a sample complaint for negligence, consisting of a single paragraph covering jurisdiction followed by one line each
for the claim and demand for relief.12 The theory went that a plaintiff
who plainly modeled their complaint on Form 11 should survive a motion to dismiss.13 In contrast, the recent holdings of the Court now require consideration of whether the allegations of a claim are “plausible,”14 a sharp departure from the language of Rule 8 and the content of
Form 11.
The contradiction between the Rules and the interpretations arrived
at by the Twombly and Iqbal courts, among other reasons, led the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules to recommend abrogating the entirety of
Rule 84 and the Forms.15 Last year, the Supreme Court of the United
States approved the recommendations and, with no intervention by Congress, the forms died a quiet death this past December.16 This Note examines the drastic and unnecessary reaction by the Advisory Committee
and recommends what would have been a more evenhanded approach to
resolving the pleading juxtaposition created by the Court: amending only
those forms affected by Twombly and Iqbal—to wit, Rule 8 and Forms
10 through 21. It may be that the Advisory Committee cannot craft a
sample complaint that would in all cases be sufficient under the Court’s
interpretations, but that is precisely the point. It is an uncomfortable conversation that needs to happen: the Court changed the Rules in Twombly
and Iqbal without going through the appropriate legislative process. Now
the process has been used to sweep the mess under the rug. If the Advisory Committee could not prepare a sufficient sample complaint, how
can we expect plaintiffs to do so?

10. Id. at 2. Professor Spencer states that the “principal function of the forms was to reify the
liberal vision of the Federal Rules and to guard against deviations therefrom.” Id.
11. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
12. FED. R. CIV. P. Appendix of Forms, Form 11.
13. See, e.g., García–Catalán v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 2013).
14. Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007).
15. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
AGENDA BOOK FOR MAY 29–30, 2014, COMM. MEETING 412 (2014), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Agenda%20Books/Standing/ST201405.pdf [hereinafter COMM. AGENDA BOOK MAY 2014].
16. A full copy of the packet of amendments forwarded to Congress by the Supreme Court on
April 29, 2015, may be found at http://www.supremecourt.gov/orders/courtorders/
frcv15%28update%29_1823.pdf (last visited May 21, 2015) [hereinafter Amendments].
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Part I of this Note discusses the history of Twombly and Iqbal and
their effect on pleading standards under the Rules. Part II describes how
courts have struggled, unsuccessfully in many cases, to reconcile the
Court’s interpretation with the language of Rule 8 and the illustrative
forms under Rule 84. Part III outlines the response of the Standing
Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure to the dilemma created by
Twombly and Iqbal. Finally, Part IV discusses the author’s alternative to
abrogation of the Forms.
I. THE RIPPLES OF TWOMBLY AND IQBAL
A. First Came Twombly . . .
In 2007, the Supreme Court caused a shift in pleading requirements
when it considered the antitrust case of Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly.17
The plaintiffs in the original action—representing subscribers to local
telephone and internet services—sought to break up the monopolies held
by various regional telecommunications corporations.18 The complaint
alleged violations of § 1 of the Sherman Act19, which prohibits all contracts in restraint of trade or commerce.20 As support for this allegation,
the plaintiffs pointed to the behavior of the regional corporations including: (1) parallel conduct in each region seemingly designed to stifle
competition; (2) common failure to pursue attractive business opportunities when doing so would compete with another regional corporation;
and (3) the statement by one regional chief executive officer noting that
competition with another regional corporation did not seem right.21
The district court originally dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims, noting
that an allegation of parallel business conduct, taken alone, did not suffice for a claim under § 1.22 According to the district court, the plaintiffs
were required to plead additional facts tending “to exclude independent
self-interested conduct as an explanation for defendants’ parallel behavior.”23 The court of appeals reversed, stating that the complaint had been
tested under the wrong standard and that additional facts were unneces-

17. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544.
18. Id. at 550.
19. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2004).
20. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 550.
21. Id. at 550–51.
22. Id. at 552.
23. Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 313 F. Supp. 2d 174, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 2003), vacated 425 F.3d
99 (2d Cir. 2005).
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sary.24 The ruling was appealed and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.
The Court’s analysis appeared to be grounded in both the language
of Rule 8 and what the requirements meant when taken with the ability to
attack the sufficiency of a complaint under Rule 12. The Court began its
analysis by considering Rule 8(a)(2), which requires “a short and plain
statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief.”25
The purpose of this requirement, according to the Court, was to “give the
defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and the grounds upon
which it rests.”26 However, a complaint attacked under Rule 12(b)(6)
strikes at the plaintiffs’ obligations to provide the “grounds” of their “entitle[ment] to relief,” requiring more than mere labels, conclusions, or
formulaic recitations of the elements.27 Notably, the Court quoted
Rule 8(a) when it referred to the “grounds” of a complaint, yet that word
appears only in Rule 8(a)(1) referring to the “grounds for the court’s jurisdiction,” not in Rule 8(a)(2) dealing with the “short and plain statement that the pleader is entitled to relief.”28 Regardless, the Court determined that it need not accept as true those allegations not supported by
factual allegations and that a plaintiff must plead enough facts such that
the remaining allegations are “plausible” and “not merely consistent
with” the allegations.29
It is clear from the Court’s discussion that the “plausible” standard
was meant to be narrow and uncontroversial. Because the issue in the
case, as stated by the Court, was a determination of the “proper standard
for pleading an antitrust conspiracy through allegations of parallel conduct,” the new “plausible” pleading standard was meant only to apply to
pleadings in those limited claims.30 Immediately after announcing the
(new) standard, the Court attempted to clearly distinguish between the
plausible standard required and a heightened pleading standard reaching
probability.31 The Court even pointed out that well-pleaded complaints

24. Twombly v. Bell Atl. Corp., 425 F.3d 99, 114 (2d Cir. 2005), rev’d 550 U.S. 544 (2007)
(holding that “plus factors are not required to be pleaded to permit an antitrust claim based on parallel conduct to survive dismissal”).
25. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555 (quoting FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(2)).
26. Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 47 (1957)).
27. Id. (alteration in original) (citing generally Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265 (1986)).
28. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a).
29. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 557.
30. Id. at 553.
31. Id. at 556 (“Asking for plausible grounds to infer an agreement does not impose a probability requirement at the pleading stage; it simply calls for enough fact to raise a reasonable expectation
that discovery will reveal evidence of illegal agreement.”).
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under the “plausible” pleading standard may still go forward despite
“savvy judge[s]” believing that proof of a plaintiff’s case is improbable.32
Unfortunately, Rule 8 makes no distinction between antitrust cases
and any other cause of action, and the Court did not make the narrow
application explicit in its opinion. Thus, “plausibility” became the new
standard for all civil pleadings going forward.33
B. . . . Then Came Iqbal
Nearly two years to the day after its decision in Twombly, the Court
had occasion to again consider pleading standards in the case of Ashcroft
v. Iqbal.34 The plaintiff, a Pakistani Muslim, brought charges against a
number of government officials, including former Attorney General John
Ashcroft, following the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.35 In his
complaint, Mr. Iqbal alleged that various institutional behaviors amounted to a policy of systemic discrimination against Muslims in violation of
the First and Fifth Amendments to the Constitution.36 The defendants
filed for dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6), but their motion was denied.37
On appeal, the appellate court applied the “plausibility” test as decided in
Twombly, ultimately deciding that Mr. Iqbal’s claim did not require “amplification” with additional factual allegations.38
The appellate court’s opinion, however, revealed a strained application of the Twombly standard against the Rules. On one hand, the court
expressed concern that federal government officials might be subjected
to “inherently onerous discovery requests” by other plaintiffs regarding
other national security programs and policies.39 On the other hand, the
court seemed to stress that the Twombly test should not be applied as a
heightened pleading standard, going so far as to quote the Supreme
Court’s earlier proclamation that heightened pleading standards “must be
obtained by the process of amending the Federal Rules, and not by judicial interpretation.”40

32. Id.
33. See, e.g., In re Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. Wage & Hour Litig., 505 F. Supp. 2d 609, 613 (N.D.
Cal. 2007) (tort action involving violation of California’s wage and overtime laws); Marshall v.
West, 507 F. Supp. 2d 1285, 1288 (M.D. Ala. 2007) (case involving a violation of civil rights arising
out of a stop and search); Pub. Warehousing Co. K.S.C. v. Def. Supply Ctr. Phila., 489 F. Supp. 2d
30, 35 (D.D.C. 2007) (case involving government contracts).
34. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
35. Id. at 666.
36. Id. at 669.
37. Id.
38. Iqbal v. Hasty, 490 F.3d 143, 158 (2d Cir. 2007), rev’d 556 U.S. 662 (2009).
39. Id. at 179.
40. Id. at 158 (quoting Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N. A., 534 U.S. 506, 515 (2002)).
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With these arguments in mind, the Supreme Court granted certiorari. The Court began its analysis by restating the core tenants from
Twombly: (1) that the court need not accept as true legal conclusions not
supported by factual allegations; and (2) that only a complaint that states
a plausible claim for relief survives a motion to dismiss.41 From this twopronged test, the Court in Iqbal distilled two “working principles”: (1)
threadbare recitals of a cause of action’s elements, supported by “merely
conclusory statements,” will not suffice; and (2) a court is required to
draw on “its own judicial experience and common sense” when determining whether a complaint is plausible.42 Whether the Court was adding
new components to the Twombly test or just explaining how judges
should arrive at “plausibility,” the end result was the same: surviving a
motion to dismiss became much harder.
Academic commentators were swift to point out the paradoxical effect of Iqbal’s ruling when compared to the simple requirements of Rule
8.43 The two-part test in Iqbal seemed to call upon language noticeably
absent in the Rule itself44 while creating greater unpredictability for litigants contrary to the “simplicity and brevity” envisioned under Rule
84.45 Even Congress was spurred into action, introducing measures in
both the House and Senate to rescind the Court’s decision.46 However,
both measures stalled when the Judicial Conference of the United States
asked Congress not to intercede so that the Rules Enabling Act process
could sort through the issue.47 The Court’s analysis is made even more
confusing when one considers that, just three weeks prior to its decision
in Iqbal, the Court reviewed and approved changes to Form 11 (renumbered from Form 9).48 The changes to this basic complaint form for negligence actually provided fewer specifics than the prior version, raising
the question: Would a complaint drafted pursuant to Form 11, as ap-

41. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678–79 (“Rule 8 marks a notable and generous departure from the
hyper-technical, code-pleading regime of a prior era, but it does not unlock the doors of discovery
for a plaintiff armed with nothing more than conclusions.”).
42. Id.
43. See, e.g., Jeremiah J. McCarthy & Matthew D. Yusick, Twombly and Iqbal: Has the Court
“Messed Up the Federal Rules?,” 4 FED. CTS. L. REV. 121 (2011).
44. For example, the word “plausibility” is found nowhere within Rule 8. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8.
45. FED. R. CIV. P. 84.
46. See generally Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. (2009); Open
Access to Courts Act of 2009, H.R. 4115, 111th Cong. (2009).
47. Letter from James. C. Duff, Sec’y, Judicial Conference of the United States, to Rep. John
Conyers, Jr., Chairman, H. Comm. on the Judiciary (May 11, 2010); see Memorandum from the
Admin. Office of the Courts to the Standing Comm. (May 18, 2010), available at
https://www.hitpages.com/doc/6708666036125696/1.
48. McCarthy & Yusick, supra note 43, at 128.
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proved by the Court, pass its minimal pleading standards outlined three
weeks later in Iqbal?49 The answer to this question remains unclear.
II. HARMONY OR DISCORD BETWEEN TWOMBLY, IQBAL, AND RULE 84
A. Pleading and Form 11
In addition to scholarly critique, district and appellate courts have
also struggled to reconcile the (new) test with the pleading requirements
outlined in Rule 8 and illustrated by the Forms. In García–Catalán v.
United States, the district court dismissed the complaint because it failed
to state a “plausible” claim under Iqbal and Twombly, but the First Circuit reversed, specifically citing Form 11 and stating that the plaintiff had
“plainly modeled” the complaint on the Form.50 In the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, the court more bluntly stated its position
that a “pleading, motion, or other paper that follows one of the Official
Forms cannot be successfully attacked.”51 Thus, to the extent that
Twombly and Iqbal can be read to conflict with the Forms, at least some
courts in the Federal Circuit believe that “the Forms control.”52 Several
unpublished opinions have followed this line of reasoning, going so far
as to openly resist the Twombly and Iqbal tests. In fact, one court in a
surprising act of prescience stated as follows: “Absent an explicit abrogation of these forms by the Supreme Court, this court presumes that they
are ‘sufficient to withstand attack under the rules under which they are
drawn’ and ‘practitioner[s] using them may rely on them to that extent.’”53
B. Patent Litigation
Patent litigation in particular has served as a prime example of the
Court’s fracture over how to reconcile Twombly and Iqbal with
49. Id.
50. García–Catalán v. United States, 734 F.3d 100, 104 (1st Cir. 2013).
51. R+L Carriers, Inc. v. DriverTech LLC, 681 F.3d 1323, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (quoting
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & RICHARD L. MARCUS, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3162 (2d ed. 1997)).
52. R+L Carriers, Inc., 681 F.3d at 1334.
53. Mark IV Indus. Corp. v. Transcore, L.P., C.A. No. 09-418 GMS, 2009 WL 4828661, at *4
(D. Del. Dec. 2, 2009) (alteration in original) (“Iqbal did not squarely address the continued vitality
of the pleading forms appended to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”); see also Automated
Transactions, LLC v. First Nigeria Fin. Grp., Inc., No. 10–CV–00407(A)(M), 2010 WL 5819060, at
*3 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2010) (“In my view, reconciling the dictates of Twombly and Iqbal with the
Appendix Forms is not merely difficult, it is impossible. Whereas Iqbal decrees that ‘conclusions or
a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do,’ the Appendix Forms allege
conclusions which fail to even mention the elements of a cause of action.”) (internal citation omitted).
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Rule 84.54 Although patent law is a notoriously tumultuous sea to navigate, the pleading standards set forth in Form 18 were, like its counterpart in Form 11, undeniably barebones.55 Courts have taken numerous
different approaches to harmonizing Form 18 with the Twombly and Iqbal standards set forth by the Supreme Court. The end result was a lack
of uniformity, frustrating practitioners and judges alike.56
While some courts have drawn the line clearly that “the Forms control,” there is dissention and disagreement within the ranks as to the quality of that control.57 In R+L Carriers, Inc. v. DriverTech LLC, the court
indicated that providing fewer facts than what is laid out in Form 18 may
be sufficient.58 Other defenders of Form 18 took a more conservative
approach, noting that the Form offered guidance only for pleading direct
patent infringement but no other types of infringement.59 Thus, a complaint alleging indirect patent infringement (such as through inducement
or contributory infringement) had to be analyzed under the lens of
Twombly and Iqbal and not simply through the Forms themselves.60 Finally, some defenders of the Forms critiqued Form 18 for not addressing
the complexities of patent infringement claims involving multiple or different types of products.61
54. See, e.g., Eolas Techs., Inc. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., No. 6:09-CV-446, 2010 WL 2026627,
at *2 (E.D. Tex. May 6, 2010) (“The Supreme Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal have not
affected the adequacy of complying with Form 18. To hold otherwise would render Rule 84 and
Form 18 invalid. This cannot be the case.”).
55. FED. R. CIV. P. Appendix of Forms, Form 18. The Form requires only a statement of jurisdiction, an assertion of patent ownership, a simple claim of infringement, a certification that notice
of the infringement was provided to the defendant, and a demand for relief.
56. Tyco Fire Prods. LP v. Victaulic Co., 777 F. Supp. 2d 893 (E.D. Pa. 2011). The court concedes that “[i]t is not easy to reconcile Form 18 with the guidance of the Supreme Court in Twombly
and Iqbal.” Id. at 905. The court goes on to imply that a pleading made under Form 11 (“outlining a
three-paragraph complaint for negligence”) would survive a motion to dismiss under Twombly/Iqbal.
Id.
57. R+L Carriers, Inc., 681 F.3d at 1334. Although Form 18 refers to the infringement of a
specific “device,” the complaint may still survive a motion to dismiss if it provides “notice and facial
plausibility” of the allegations, which is “not an extraordinarily high [bar].” See M. Andrew Holtman, C. Brandon Rash & Luke J. McCammon, Avoiding Dismissal in Patent Infringement Cases: An
Update on the Twombly / Iqbal Pleading Standard, 26 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 10 (2014).
58. K-Tech Telecomms., Inc. v. Time Warner Cable, Inc., 714 F.3d 1277, 1286 (Fed. Cir.
2013).
59. R+L Carriers, 681 F.3d at 1336; see also Halton Co. v. Streivor, Inc., No. C10-00655
WHA, 2010 WL 2077203, at *3 (N.D. Cal. May 21, 2010) (“On its face, however, Form 18 is silent
as to any theory of patent infringement besides direct infringement.”); Eolas Techs., Inc., 2010 WL
2026627, at *3 (“Form 18 does not expressly address indirect infringement claims . . . .”); Gradient
Enters., Inc. v. Skype Techs. S.A., 932 F. Supp. 2d 447 (W.D.N.Y. 2013) (suggesting that Form 18
applies to patent infringement cases, and not patent invalidity claims).
60. Holtman, Rash & McCammon, supra note 57, at 11.
61. See Stacy O. Stitham & David Swetnam-Burland, Fractious Form 18, 45
CONNTEMPLATIONS 1, 5 (2012); Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Intergraph Corp., No. C 03-2517 MJJ,
2003 WL 23884794, at *1 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 6, 2003) (“In light of these facts, Plaintiff’s claim must
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The underlying question remains: did the Forms stand above
Twombly and Iqbal in the hierarchy of authority, or did the Supreme
Court manage to change the rules of the game without changing the
Rules?62 Up until this year the answer was unclear, with courts taking
positions all along the spectrum and then sniping at their colleagues for
disagreeing. One Eastern District of Virginia court noted that “the
threshold problem with [cases such as R+L Carriers] is that they accord
no force to either the text or teaching of Twombly and Iqbal which require more to plead a legally sufficient claim than is set out in Form
18.”63 However, one thing is certain: the lower courts made no effort to
hide the direct collision between the Federal Rules and the decisions of
Twombly and Iqbal. And now that the Forms have been tossed aside, this
particular riddle will never be solved.
III. THE ADVISORY COMMITTEE’S RESPONSE
Given the difficulties experienced by the lower court in applying
the new pleading standard, the Advisory Committee considered a revision to the Rules to confront the issue. Under federal law, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure may be changed only pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act.64 The Rules Enabling Act, very generally, requires deliberation by the Advisory Committee on Civil Rules followed by an opportunity for public comment on any proposed changes to the Rules.65 Any
proposed changes must then be presented to the Supreme Court before
finally giving Congress a chance to intervene prior to enactment.66 Because Twombly and Iqbal seemingly changed the Rules in violation of
the Rules Enabling Act process—without public input or congressional
oversight—the Advisory Committee ostensibly had a problem on its
hands.
Initially, the Advisory Committee held off on taking action, preferring instead to observe the effect of the Supreme Court’s decisions as
they played out in the lower courts.67 In the meantime, Congress made

be read as follows: one or more of Defendant’s 4000-plus products directly infringes, contributorily
infringes, or induces infringement of at least one claim in each of the patents-in-suit. Form [18]
simply does not address a factual scenario of this sort.”).
62. See Holtman, Rash & McCammon, supra note 57.
63. Macronix Int’l, Co. v. Spansion Inc., No. 3:13-cv-679, 2014 WL 934505, at *6 (E.D. Va.
Mar. 10, 2014).
64. Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071–77 (1988).
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
MINUTES FOR OCT. 8–9, 2009, COMM. MEETING 8 (2009), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/CV10-2009-min.pdf [hereinafter COMM. MIN. OCT. 2009]

2016]

If It (Ain’t) Broke, Don’t Fix It

1385

several attempts to repeal the Court’s holding in Twombly and Iqbal, but
neither bill survived the Judicial Committee.68 In 2009, the Advisory
Committee considered abrogation of Rule 84 and the Appendix of
Forms, but no action was taken at that time.69 The Committee noted that
“[abrogation] so soon would generate a perception that the Forms were
being abrogated because the pleading forms, sufficient under notice
pleading as it had been understood up to 2007, no longer suffice under
Twombly and Iqbal.”70 The Committee found that to be “a serious reason
to hold off,” for the time being, on complete abrogation.71
The Advisory Committee revisited the Forms in 2011 when it again
considered abrogation under the specter of the “debates engendered by
Twombly and Iqbal.”72 While it found the Forms had been “important in
1938” when the pleading philosophy was new, the Committee found that
the Rules had now “matured.”73 The Committee further lamented the
“great amounts of time” required in managing and updating the Forms
and espoused a desire for some method in revising the Forms outside of
the Enabling Act process.74 This comment on a speedier method of form
revision was framed as being useful when “respond[ing] to changing circumstances.”75 Again, the implicit message was that cases such as
Twombly and Iqbal did necessitate an update of the Forms outside of the
Enabling Act process—even if the Committee insisted that abrogation
“need not be seen as implicit commentary on the Twombly and Iqbal
decisions.”76 Having laid the foundation for a critical review of the
Forms, the Committee concluded simply that “work should begin on
Rule 84.”77 A subcommittee was formed soon thereafter to begin reviewing the Forms and proposing solutions. Members of the subcommittee

(“[A]ny hasty response in the Enabling Act process or in Congress might miss the mark. But ongoing consideration is not the same as hasty action. It seems wise to maintain constant attention.”).
68. Notice Pleading Restoration Act of 2009, S. 1504, 111th Cong. § 2 (2009); Notice Pleading
Restoration Act of 2010, S. 4054, 111th Cong. (2010).
69. COMM. MIN. OCT. 2009, supra note 67, at 16.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
MINUTES FOR APRIL 4–5, 2011 COMM. MEETING 32 (2011), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Minutes/Civil-Minutes-2011-04.pdf [hereinafter COMM. MIN.
APRIL 2011].
73. Id. (“The pleading forms were time-bound; they are no longer important.”).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 32–33 (“Revising the whole framework need not be seen as implicit commentary on
the Twombly and Iqbal decisions, but instead can be recognized for what it is—a program to shift
the initiating responsibility for forms away from the full Enabling Act process.”).
77. Id. at 33.
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surveyed judges, law firms, public interest law offices, and individual
lawyers, and concluded that “virtually none of them use the forms.”78
On May 2, 2014, the guillotine was prepared at last. In a report to
the Standing Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure, the Advisory Committee recommended abrogating Rule 84 and all of the accompanying forms.79 The reasons for complete abrogation were twofold: first,
the Committee brought up the familiar argument that regular review of
the Forms required more time than was available without diverting attention from “more important tasks”; and second, the Committee discussed
in greater detail the “tension” between the Forms and modern pleading
standards.80 To illustrate its second point, the Committee pointed to “Supreme Court decisions on the requirements of Rule 8 [specifically
Twombly and Iqbal], and a general increase in the complexity of litigation,” among other reasons, as the source of friction with the Forms.81
With regard to the complexity of litigation, the Committee noted that a
single form may often not suffice with some particularly complex areas
of law—such as patent infringement.82
The Committee was not content to rest purely on the same arguments made three years prior, and it took a swipe at opponents of abrogation as well. Notwithstanding the disrespect to Civil Procedure professors
across the nation, the Committee expressed concern that “most of the
opposition to abrogation springs from the academic community” based
on a “continuing unease over the direction of contemporary federal
pleading.”83 It is hard to believe that this statement did not receive even a
glare from Committee member Robert H. Klonoff, Dean of Lewis &
Clark Law School and an expert in the area of civil procedure. Additionally, the Committee noted the argument of some opponents that the abrogation proposal violated the Rules Enabling Act.84 These opponents argued that the Forms had become integral parts of the rules they illustrated, and thus, any change to the Forms necessarily required a change to

78. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
AGENDA E-19 SUMMARY 93 (2014), available at http://www.uscourts.gov/uscourts/
RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-2014.pdf.
79. COMM. AGENDA BOOK MAY 2014, supra note 15, at 412.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id. (“[S]ome of the uncertainty lies in determining whether a single form could be crafted
to address the wide variety of factual circumstances that might arise with respect to any particular
type of claim, such as patent infringement.”).
83. Id.
84. Id.
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the accompanying rules as well.85 Despite these objections, the Committee urged that abrogation was still the “best course.”86
The Standing Committee approved abrogation during its session in
May 2014, and the Civil Rules amendments were sent for consideration
to the Judicial Conference of the United States.87 On September 16,
2014, the Judicial Conference approved the proposed amendments and
forwarded them to the United States Supreme Court for review.88 The
Court approved the amendments and forwarded them to Congress,
which, to the shock of no one, did not intervene.89 The guillotine had
fallen and the Forms were no more.
IV. THE ALTERNATIVE: HONEST DIALOGUE AND TARGETED CHANGES
The statement that the United States Supreme Court substantially
changed the pleading requirements under the Rules outside of the Rules
Enabling Act process is neither controversial nor excessive. Many legal
scholars, academics, practitioners, and district court judges have openly
acknowledged this reality.90 The problems lie, however, with the Court’s
stubborn refusal to do the same—a position expressed by the Advisory
Committee as well.91 Supporting this legal fiction resulted in the sacrifice
of Rule 84 and all of the Forms, yet such a solution was unnecessary.
Precedent already exists for amendment of both the Rules and the
Forms in tandem. In 1993, Rule 4 was amended to include waiver of service as an acceptable method under the Rules.92 Along with the amendments to Rule 4, Forms 1A and 1B were adopted to demonstrate how the
new summons and waiver of service of process would work in practice.93
Additionally, in a comment by the Judicial Conference, the amendments
to Rule 4 were noted to serve two important purposes, one of which was
85. Id. For an excellent discussion of this argument in much greater detail, see Brooke D.
Coleman, Abrogation Magic: The Rules Enabling Act Process, Civil Rule 84, and the Forms, 15
NEV. L.J. 1093 (2015).
86. COMM. AGENDA BOOK MAY 2014, supra note 15, at 413.
87. CCL’s Nannery Attends Meeting of Committee on Rules of Practice & Procedure, CTR.
FOR CONST. LITIG. (June 2, 2014), http://www.cclfirm.com/blog/13984/.
88. Judicial Conference Receives Budget Update, Forwards Rules Package to Supreme Court,
UNITED STATES COURTS (Sept. 16, 2014), http://news.uscourts.gov/judicial-conference-receivesbudget-update-forwards-rules-package-supreme-court.
89. Amendments, supra note 16.
90. See supra Part II.
91. See e.g., COMM. MIN. OCT. 2009, supra note 67; COMM. MIN. APRIL 2011, supra note 72;
COMM. MIN. MAY 2014, supra note 15.
92. COMM. ON RULES OF PRACTICE & PROCEDURE OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE OF THE U.S.,
AGENDA
E-19
SUMMARY
244
(1992),
available
at
http://www.uscourts.gov/
uscourts/RulesAndPolicies/rules/Reports/ST09-1992.pdf.
93. Id. Forms 1A and 1B are currently named Forms 5 and 6 following the re-styling of the
Rules in 2007.
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to “‘codify’ the Supreme Court’s decision in Houston v. Lack.”94 In so
doing, the Judicial Conference—and by extension, the Supreme Court—
acknowledged that the Forms were invariably tied to the rules they illustrate, even when a Supreme Court decision might modify those rules.
In the context of Rule 4, the amendment process provided by the
Rules Enabling Act functioned precisely as it was meant to. The Rules
and Forms were updated in tandem to codify a Supreme Court decision,
with complete transparency for public comment and Congressional review.95 In stark contrast, the method of bringing the Rules in line with
the Court’s decisions in Twombly and Iqbal was more akin to avoidance
rather than transparency. The struggle of district courts to reconcile the
Forms with the Court’s decisions suggests that the Forms were glaring
examples of how the Court changed the rules outside of the Rules Enabling Act process. Because the evidence was on the table, and because of
the amount of time required to fix this mess, the Advisory Committee
was content to simply sweep the evidence under the rug.96
There were plenty of reasons, both as practice and as policy, for the
Advisory Committee to avoid rule revision;97 yet, for better or for worse,
the Rules Enabling Act process is precisely what was needed. Rather
than abrogate the entirety of Rule 84 and the Forms, the Advisory Committee would have been better served trying to amend Forms 10
through 21 so that they conform to the standards laid out in Twombly and
Iqbal. Had the Advisory Committee failed to draft twelve complaints that
lived up to the Court’s vague, imprecise standards, then the Court may
well have rejected the proposed changes.98 Alternatively, public commentary could have unleashed a hornet’s nest of frustration as to how
unpredictable the Twombly and Iqbal standards are for plaintiffs. Regardless of the outcome, the insulated bubble of the Supreme Court might
have been breached long enough for the Court to realize that Justice
Ginsburg was right: the Court has indeed made a mess of the Rules. In
this regard, the Rules Enabling Act process would have provided the sort
of check on judicial interpretation that it was designed for. Instead, the
Court may go on insisting that Iqbal and Twombly changed nothing.
94. Id. at 20.
95. Id. at 9–11.
96. COMM. AGENDA BOOK MAY 2014, supra note 15, at 412 (“Abrogation is recommended in
large part because this Committee has not been able to spare any significant share of its agenda for
regular review and potential revision of the official forms . . . . A secondary consideration has been
the tension that may be found between the forms and modern pleadings standards.”).
97. See generally Lonny Hoffman, Rulemaking in the Age of Twombly and Iqbal, 46 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1483 (2013). Professor Hoffman examines a variety of hurdles that might have dissuaded the rulemaking committee from revising the Forms, including the ability of the Court to
block any proposed changes. Id.
98. Id. at 1552.
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CONCLUSION
Excising the Forms as the Court has done provided neither clarity
to practitioners struggling to abide by the Twombly and Iqbal standards
nor a coherent standard for judges to use in adjudicating a 12(b)(6) motions to dismiss. Perhaps more alarmingly, the death of the Forms raises
the concern that the Court can avoid the Rules Enabling Act when changing Federal Rules of Civil Procedure simply by virtue of the Advisory
Committee declaring the rules unchanged.99 Even if the Advisory Committee could not bring the Forms in line with the requirements of
Twombly and Iqbal, there would have been significant benefit from making the effort.
As it stands now, the Forms have been thrown out, and the Court
continues to insist that Twombly and Iqbal made no changes to pleading
standards under Rule 8. The abrogation of the Forms simply emboldens
this legal fiction. On the other hand, an attempt by the Advisory Committee to bring the Forms in line would have demonstrated the herculean
task that practitioners in federal courts face every day. The Court would
have been required to confront the mess it had made—especially if the
Committee had determined that no sample complaint would suffice! After all, if the Advisory Committee could not draft a sample complaint
that suffices under the Court’s standard, how can we expect practitioners
to do so?
In the end, avoidance won the day. The task of sorting through the
pleading conundrum now falls to the district and appellate courts, and
plaintiffs are no closer to finding the “simplicity and brevity” that Rule
84 once promised.

99. See Coleman, supra note 85.

